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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Frank J. Tankovich, appellant herein, appeals from judgment and sentence 
against him for Malicious Harassment, a felony, I.C. §§ 18-7902, 18-204, and 
Conspiracy to Commit Malicious Harassment, a felony, I.C. §§ 18-7902, 18-7901 
pursuant to the District Court's Order Suspending Execution of Judgment and Sentence 
thereon. (R. 715-719). 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Appellant Frank J. Tankovich was charged with Malicious Harassment, a felony, 
I.C. §§ 18-7902, 18-204, and Conspiracy to Commit Malicious Harassment, a felony, 
I.C. §§ 18-7902, 18-7901 by way of Indictment filed November 2, 2009 \:~ ?9-31), and 
ultimately Third Amended Indictment filed April 26, 2010. (R. 390-392). Those 
indictments alleged that Mr. Tankovich, maliciously and with specific intent to intimidate 
or harass another person because of that person's race, threaten said person, and that 
Mr. Tankovich conspired with his brothers William and Ira Tankovich to commit that said 
crime. 
Factually, the State alleged: (1) that Ira Tankovich, and/or the codefendants, on 
August 16, 2009, made contact with a Mr. Requenta, (2) that on thSlt same day, Ira 
Tankovich returned to Mr. Requenta's home with a firearm, and; (3) on that same day, 
after Ira Tankovich and/or the others had made contact with Mr. Requenta, William 
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Tankov[ch, Jr., and Frank Tankovich (defendant herein), returned to Mr. Requenta's 
home and maliciously and with specific intent to intimidate or harass Mr. Requenta due 
to race or color, etc., made disparaging racial remarks to Mr. Requenta and threatened 
him by word or act to cause him physical injury, giving Mr. Requenta reasonable cause 
to believe the action threatened would occur. (R. 39-40, 391). 
Upon motion by the State, the District Court joined the matters for trial, subject to 
consideration of any application for relief from prejudicial joinder. (R. 64-65). 
Mr. Tankovich twice moved to sever the trials under J.C.R. 14. :R. 69-71, 99-
107, 520-521). The District Court denied those motions. (Tr. Pg. 174, Line 13 - Pg. 
175, Line 18, Tr. Pg. 1531, Line 9 - Pg. 1534, Line 6). 
Mr. Tankovich also objected to the State's motions in limine to allow evidence of 
the tattoos previously discussed into the case against him, and expert testimony 
regarding the same. (R. 79-80, 508-11). The District Court allowed the evidence and 
expert testimony. (Tr., Pg .. 176, Line 8 - Pg. 181, Line 15). 
The matter went to a first trial that ended in a mistrial due to prosecutorial 
misconduct and legal defect in the proceeding preventing a fair trial. (1';, Pg. 455, Line 
1 - Pg .. 456, Line 17). 
The matter then went to a second trial that ended again in mistrial, ~his time due 
to hung jury. (Tr. Pg. 1467, Lines 1 - 20). 
The matter went to trial again, at which time Frank Tankovich was convicted, and 
ultimately judgment and sentence was entered and suspended. (R. 715 - 719). 




A. Did the District Court err by denying the Appellant's Motion to Sever trials? 
B. Did the District Court err by allowing testimony and evidence of the tattoos 
borne by Frank Tankovich's codefendants? 
C. Did the District Court err by allowing expert testimony regarding the same 
tattoos borne by Frank Tankovich's codefendants? 




A. The District Court erred by denying the Appellant's Motions to ~0\f"er Trials. 
An abuse of discretion standard is applied when reviewing the denial of a motion 
to sever pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 14; however, that rule presumes joinder was 
proper in the first place. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 165 P.3d 273 (2007). Idaho 
Criminal Rule 14 provides the mechanism for relief from prejudicial joinder of trials. 
That rule states that if it appears that a defendant is prejudiced by the joinder of 
offenses or defendants for trial together, the court may, among other remedies, grant 
separate trials. 
When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate 
court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to 
the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600,768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). 
When reviewing an order denying a motion to sever, the inquiry on appeal is 
whether the defendant has presented facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice resulted 
from a joint trial, which denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. Eguilior, 137 Idaho 903, 
908, 55 P .3d 896, 901 (Ct. App. 2002). In cases such as this, Idaho appellate courts 
review the trial proceeding to determine whether one or more of the followi;1g "potential 
sources of prejudice" appeared: (a) the possibility that the jury may confuse and 
cumulate the evidence, rather than keeping the evidence properly segregated; (b) the 
potential that the defendant may be confounded in presenting defenses; and (c) the 
possibility that the jury may conclude the defendant is guilty of one crime and then find 
him or her guilty of the other simply because of his or her criminal disposition, i.e. he or 
she is a bad person. Id. 
It is Mr. Frank Tankovich's position that the joinder of his trial wi~h the trials of his 
codefendants, Ira and William Tankovich, was prejudicial to his case, due to the 
evidence of tattoos borne by the codefendants, and the expert witness testimony 
offered by the State regarding those tattoos. This evidence is offered hy the state to 
show motive or intent. Frank Tankovich does not have any tattoos. Therefore, neither 
the evidence of the tattoos, nor the expert testimony regarding the tattoos, should have 
been admitted in his case. 
The District Court itself recognized the problems in the case. At sentencing, 
Judge Luster noted that he had some serious reservations regarding whether the case 
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was about race, or really about traditional malicious harassment. (Tr. Fg. 2330, Line 17 
- Pg. 2332, Line 2). The District Court there noted that in its view it w(luld be just as 
reasonable to conclude that the statements uttered were uttered in anger over a gun 
having been pointed at the defendants as about race. The District Court further noted 
that if the case had been tried to him, the result would have been different. (Tr. Pg. 
2334, Lines 16 -14). 
Given that the strength of the case was that tenuous, the prejudice suffered by 
Frank Tankovich by being tried along with other individuals bearing alleged racist 
tattoos, and having evidence of those tattoos, including expert testimony emphasizing 
the tattoos, is quite evident. Leaving Frank Tankovich's case joined with the others 
leads to the danger that the jury would cumulate the evidence, including that of the 
tattoos, against Frank Tankovich, and that Frank Tankovich would be confounded in 
presenting his defenses, given that his case was filled with testimony and evidence 
regarding allegedly racist tattoos that he did not own or bear. 
Given that the District Court called the case problematic, that had the case been 
tried to him he would not have convicted, that one jury hung 11 to 1 regarding Count 1 
favoring acquittal, and 8 to 4 regarding Count 2 favoring acquittal, (Tr. Pg. 1470, Line 
22 - Pg. 1471, Line 19), the record demonstrates that Frank Tankovich was unfairly 
prejudiced such that joinder prevented him from having a fair trial. Thus, the District 
Court erred by denying severance. 
B. The District Court erred by allowing testimony and evidence of the tattoos 
borne by Frank Tankovich's codefendants. 
Mr. Tankovich moved to exclude evidence of the tattoos borne by li"a Tankovich 
and William Tankovich. (R. 386 - 388). Ira Tankovich had a tattoo that included the 
words "Aryan Pride", and an eagle on his back. (R. 100,386). William Tankovich had a 
tattoo that included lightning bolt "ssn markings that were alleged to be Nazi type 
symbols. (R. 100, 386). The State sought to introduce the evidence of the above 
symbols, borne by codefendants, as evidence of state of mind, motive and intent 
concerning Mr. Frank Tankovich, and or concerning a conspiracy between the three 
codefendants (R. 73-74). However, Frank Tankovich does not have any such tattoos. 
Frank Tankovich contends that the fact that two other individuals vvhom he was 
with have tattoos of whatever kind is in no way probative regarding his state of mind, 
whether it be for proving his state of mind, or the existence of a conspiracy. Frank 
Tankovich cannot be held responsible for the tattoos borne by other individuals. 
Therefore, because the existence of tattoos on the bodies of codefendants does 
not have any tendency to make anything concerning the mind of Frank Tankovich state 
more or less probable, said evidence was not relevant in Frank Tankovich's case. 
I.R.E. 401. 
Moreover, even if the District Court did not abuse its discretion under J.R.E 401 in 
allowing the evidence of the tattoos, such evidence is legally irrelevant as against Frank 
Tankovich because its probative value regarding his state of mind and/or the existence 
of a conspiracy was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, coni;'ision of the 
issues or misleading the jury. I.R.E. 403. To the extent the fact that other individuals 
have tattoos that have Nazi or white supremacist associations bears any remote 
relationship to the state of mind of Frank Tankovich, or the existence of a conspiracy 
between the three defendants, such evidence is unfairly prejudicial against a man who 
does not have such tattoos on his body. Frank Tankovich did not put such symbols on 
his body. That others did does not say anything useful that is not dangerously 
outweighed by the prejudice or confusion risked by allowing such evidem'''? 
The State argued, and the District Court questioned, how this was different from 
a case where during a robbery two defendants covered their faces with bandanas and 
one did not. (Tr. Pg. 60, Line 8 - Pg. 62, Line 7). 
In fact, a logical distinction exists. With bandanas being worn as masks, the 
other defendants are using a piece of cloth as a tool to accomplish a crime by hiding 
their identities. In this case, the other defendants have tattoos that might or might not 
express an opinion or evidence a belief held by the person bearing the tattoo. The 
tattoos are not tools used to accomplish the crime. There is no eviden(;e in the record 
stating that the alleged victim observed the tattoos or was intimidated by them or that 
the tattoos were used to commit the crime or form a conspiracy. Therefore the 
existence of tattoos on the bodies of codefendants is not at all the same as bandanas 
being worn by codefendants to accomplish a crime. 
To the extent that said tattoos says anything about the state of mind of the 
person bearing the tattoo, it does not follow that Frank Tankovich shared the opinion. 
Even if there is some remote possibility that the tattoos on another man say anything 
about Frank Tankovich, that possibility is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair 
prejudice and confusion. The evidence should have been excluded from Frank 
Tankovich's case. 
C. The District Court erred by allowing expert testimony regarding the same 
tattoos borne by Frank Tankovich's codefendants. 
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The State offered the testimony of Tim Higgins, a former corrections employee, 
as an expert witness concerning the symbols associated with white supremacist gangs 
and groups. (R. 494-498). The State contended that Mr. Higgins' testimony would aid 
the jury in "understanding the defendants' tattoos." (R. 496). 
Frank Tankovich contends that admission of the purported 0xpert testimony 
added to the prejudice of allowing evidence regarding tattoos borne by others into the 
case against him. and further invaded the province of the jury with regar.:: !(l what those 
tattoos meant or how they were significant, especially as concerning him. who had no 
tattoos. 
All the discussion regarding what the tattoos meant concerned what a jury would 
think about "S8" symbols or "bolts", and what they indicate. The State contended that 
Mr. Higgins would testify that bearing such tattoos indicated white supremacy gang 
membership. (R. 497). The problem is that those symbols were not borne by Frank 
Tankovich, and therefore are not indicative of his beliefs or associations, or regarding 
his motives on the day in question. He objected to the proposed eVidence. (R. 509-
511). 
Additionally, the other tattoo included the words "Aryan Pride". Expert testimony 
was not necessary for the purpose of aiding the jury in what those words mean. The 
words speak for themselves, to the extent they say anything at all with regard to an 
issue in the case. However, to the extent they are probative, they are probative only as 
to their owner. not to another individual, including Frank Tankovich. 
Rather, again, said testimony does not illuminate or assist the jury with regard to 
Frank Tankovich's beliefs, mindset, associations or any other material fact in question. 
Instead, said testimony only added to the prejudice of allowing the 8\:ldence of the 
tattoos borne by other individuals into Frank Tankovich's case in the first place. 
Although the District Court instructed the jury not to consider the expert testimony as 
against Frank Tankovich, (Tr. Pg. 2124, Lines 12 - 23), the prejudice was nonetheless 
compounded. Instead of aiding the jury, the testimony added to the unfair prejudice and 
confusion created by allowing the evidence of the tattoos borne by the other charged 
individuals in the case against Frank Tankovich. I.R.E. 403. 
D. The District Court erred by failing to dismiss the case against Frank 
Tankovich due to insufficient evidence. 
The case against Frank Tankovich did not contain sufficient evidefice upon which 
the jury could convict. Where the evidence at trial is insufficient to support a jury's 
finding of guilt, the court must overturn the verdict. State v. Herrera-Bnte, 131 Idaho 
383,385,957 P2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Here, as argued previously, the District Court itself recognized the problems in 
the case. Judge Luster noted that he had some serious reservations regarding whether 
the case was about race, or really about traditional malicious harassment. (Tr. Pg. 
2330, Line 17 - Pg. 2332, Line 2). He also stated that in his view it would be just as 
reasonable to conclude that the statements uttered were uttered in anger over a gun 
having been pointed at the defendants as about race. The Court furthel" noted that if the 
case had been tried to him, the result would have been different (Tr. Pg. 2334, Lines 
16 - 14). 
Given that the strength of the case was that tenuous, the prejudice suffered by 
Frank Tankovich by being tried along with other individuals bearing alleged racist 
tattoos, and having evidence of those tattoos, including expert testimony emphasizing 
the tattoos, was stronger than the evidence in the case. Leaving Frank Tankovich's 
case joined with the others leads to the danger that the jury would cumulate the 
evidence, especially that of the tattoos, against Frank Tankovich, and that Frank 
Tankovich would be confounded in presenting his defenses, given that his case was 
filled with testimony and evidence regarding allegedly racist tattoos that !:f> did not own 
or bear and which were not displayed during the incident. The other facts in evidence 
demonstrate an angry confrontation during which the alleged victim puiled a gun and 
pOinted it at the defendants. Though Frank Tankovich may have yelled some angry 
statements, the evidence of racial intent is extremely deficient, especially when 
considered without the tattoo evidence, which should not have been allowed. 
Given that the District Court noted that the case was problematic and that had 
the case been tried to him, he would not have convicted, that one jury hung 11 to 1 
regarding Count 1 favoring acquittal, and 8 to 4 regarding Count 2 favoring acquittal, 
(Tr. Pg. 1470, Line 22 - Pg. 1471, Line 19). the record is strong that Frank Tankovich 
was unfairly prejudiced by failing to sever his case in a manner that prevented him from 
having a fair trial and by having his case full of testimony and evidencb i)t-)out tattoos 
that he did not possess or bear. The evidence otherwise in the case \;V~S not sufficient 
for the jury to convict. Therefore, Frank Tankovich respectfully requests that the Court 
overturn the jury's verdict against him. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Tankovich respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial 
of his motion to sever, and reverse his objections to evidence about other individuals' 
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tattoos, including the expert testimony allowed, that his conviction also bt:"' reversed, and 
the matter remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 30th day of April, 2012. 
---.--
EN D. THOMPSON 
Conflict Appellate Public Defender 
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